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AN "APP" FOR THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES 
David G. Epstein*, Alexandra W. Cook**, J. Kyle Lowder ... , 
& Michelle Sonntag•••• 
Abstract: Every year, more than 100 reported court opinions consider the question of 
whether an outsider can sue for damages under a contract made by others-in part because 
the law is so ambiguous. While contract enforcement by a third party is controlled largely by 
the facts of the particular case, it also materially depends upon the relevant legal standards. 
At present, not just the standards, but also the reasons for these standards, are unclear. 
Eig~ty years ago, Lon Fuller, 1 a professor teaching contracts at a then-Southern law 
school, and William Perdue, a student at that school, significantly clarified and improved 
decision-making fn damages issues in contract law by proposing a new vocabulary and 
analytical model. The senior author of this ArtiSle is a professor at a Southern law school, 
but he does not need an academic Lloyd Bentsen to tell him that he is "no Lon Fuller," and 
* George E. Allen Chair, University of Richmond Law School. We are grateful to the law firm of 
Allen, Allen, Allen and Allen for its generous support of the University of Richmond Law School. 
This article benefitted from faculty workshops at the University of Richmond Law School, the 
University of Arkansas Law School, St. Mary's Law School, the Texas A&M Law School, and the 
Texas Tech Law School. Thanks also to Alexis Fetzer of the University of Richmond Law Library 
for her efforts and expertise in finding sources and Corinna Lain, the University of Richmond's 
uncommonly helpful red-haired Associate Dean for Academic Development, for suggesting the 
"red-headed stepchild" reference and so much more. 
** University of Richmond Law School, Class of2017. 
*** University of Richmond Law School, Class of2017. 
****University of Richmond Law School, Class of2017. 
I. See generally Albert M. Sachs, Lon Luvois Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 349 (1978) (describing 
the legacy of Lon Fuller). 
2. Professor Fuller was a professor at Duke Law School in Durham, North Carolina-a Southern 
town if ever there was one. (Remember the movie Bull Durham?) While Duke Law School is still 
located in the Southern town of Durham, its website shows that only 19% of its students are from 
the South. Class of 2019 Profile, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edUJadmis/classprofile/ 
[https://perma.cc/L4MT-7YDG]. The website provides no information about how many of that 19% 
went to Eastern prep schools and Ivy colleges or how many of the faculty come from the South. 
Duke is, of course, a fine law school. Duke is no longer a Southern law school. 
3. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE 
L.J. 52, 53-54 (1936). 
4. See Educational Video Group, Excerpt from Vice Presidential Debate in 1988 Between Lloyd 
Bentsen and Dan Quayle, YouTuBE (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=9PCsXqbSZxc (last visited Nov. 4, 2016). The late Professor Robert Summers would have 
happily played the role of Senator Bentsen. In Professor Summers' biography of Lon Fuller, 
Professor Summer referred to Professor Fuller as "one of the four most important American legal 
theorists of the 20th century." See ROBERTS. SUMMERS, L. LON FULLER 1 (1984). The senior author 
of this article was not one of the other three. 
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the younger co-authors hold no "William Perdue illusion," given that Mr. Perdue was the 
father-in-law of their law school dean. Nonetheless, we believe that the new vocabulary and 
analytical model we are proposing would clarify and improve decision-making on third party 
contract rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The third party beneficiary doctrine is the red-headed stepchild of 
contract law as contract law is "practiced" in law schools. In the 
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standard contracts casebook, two or three third party beneficiary cases 
are inserted at the back of the book. 5 Most contracts professors do not 
even cover the third party beneficiary cases. 6 
Moreover, there has been comparatively little attention to third party 
beneficiary concepts in American law reviews. The two most cited third 
party beneficiary articles were published in 1985 7 and 1992. 8 The last 
lead article devoted to the general topic of third party beneficiary law 
was published in 1993. 9 
Third party beneficiary law gets far more attention from those who 
practice contract law in law offices and courtrooms. 10 Practitioner texts 
regularly address third party beneficiary possibilities, recommending 
that commercial contracts include provisions excluding third party 
beneficiaries. 11 Such provisions are often enforced. 12 
However, these recommendations that commercial contracts include 
provisions excluding third party beneficiaries are not universally 
followed, or when followed, the provisions are ignored by plaintiffs' 
attorneys anyway. 13 We have found more than 500 judicial opinions 
5. E.g., IAN AYRES & RICHARD E. SPIEDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 1168-91 (7th ed. 2008) 
(chapter 9 of9); JACK GRAVES, LEARNING CONTRACTS 694-707 (2014) (chapter 10of10). 
6. Cf MARK P. GERGEN, TEACHER'S MANUAL TO BASIC CONTRACT LAW NINTH EDITION 149 
(2013) ("Chapter 19. Third-Party Beneficiaries (pp.941-987) I do not cover these materials."). 
7. Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary 
Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985). 
8. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358 (1992). 
9. Jean Fleming Powers, Expanded Liability and the Intent Requirement in Third Party 
Beneficiary Contracts, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 67. There have been subsequent law review articles that 
discuss third party concepts as a part of some other, more specific topic. See, e.g., George S. Geis, 
Broadcast Contracting, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1153 (2012); Nicolas Cornell, The Puzzle of the 
Beneficiary's Bargain, 90 TuL. L. REv. 75 (2015); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third Party 
Beneficiaries and Contractual Networks, 7 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 325 (2015). 
10. Cf Harry G. Prince, Peifecting the Third Party Standing Rule Under Section 302 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 25 B.C. L. REV. 919, 920 (1984) ("A subject that should be of 
measureable concern to every practicing lawyer whose clients have even a minimal involvement in 
the American socio-economic environment."). 
11. See, e.g., SCOTT T. WITTAKER, ET AL., ABA SECTION OF Bus. LAW, WHO iNvITED You? 
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY ISSUES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS 4-134 (2005), http://apps. 
americanbar. org!buslaw/newsletter/003 8/materials/pp 7. pdf [https://perma. cc/S 7 ZQ-K3 TU]. 
12. See, e.g., Fornazor Int'!, Inc. v. Huntsman, No. 2:14-CV-291 TS, 2015 WL 6142962, at *8 
(D. Utah Oct. 19, 2015) ("Utah courts have dismissed a third party beneficiary claim pursuant to a 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the contract contained a clause declaring that there was no intended 
third-party beneficiary."). 
13. Id. ("Fornazor argues that [the] 'no third party beneficiary' disclaimer does not preclude a 
factual finding of the third party beneficiary status in the face of conflicting evidence. However, that 
is not the law in Utah."); see also Wolfv. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., IOI F. Supp. 3d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 
2015) ("The Tour Operator Agreement at issue here contains the following language with respect to 
third party beneficiaries: 'Other than as expressly set forth herein, this Agreement shall not be 
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issued in the last five years that have considered the question of when a 
person, who is not a party to a contract, is able to enforce that contract 
because the individual is an "intended third party beneficiary." 14 
Most of the cases use not only the term "intended third party 
beneficiary," but also the terms "promisor" and "promisee." These 
familiar terms can be confusing because in most contracts each party is 
making a promise to the other. In third party beneficiary terminology, 
the person whose promise the third party is seeking to enforce is the 
promisor and the other contracting party is the promisee. 15 
Consider this hypothetical: 16 Ed Blomquist contracts with Bud 
Jorgenlen to buy Bud's Butcher Shop in Luverne, Minnesota. Ed 
breaches the contract. Bud's Butcher Shop closes. Noreen Vanderslice, 
who worked at the butcher shop, sues Ed for breach of contract. Even 
though promisor Ed made his promise to promisee Bud, courts in 
Minnesota and elsewhere will, today, hold that third party Noreen can 
recover from promisor Ed for breach of contract if Noreen is an 
"intended third party beneficiary." 17 
deemed to provide third persons with any remedy, claim, right, or action or other right.' Through its 
express terms, no reading of that language would allow for a finding of either an express or implied 
intent by the parties to primarily or directly benefit Mr. Wolf. Not only does the contract expressly 
disclaim any intent to provide third parties with any rights, but there are no other provisions in the 
contract from which to infer any intent to directly benefit passengers like Mr. Wolf. Mr. Wolf 
argues that the requisite intent should be gleaned from contract provisions requiring OCT to acquire 
insurance before operating, but I disagree." (internal citations omitted)). 
14. Our use of the term "intended third party beneficiary" to describe a third party who can 
enforce a contract is consistent with the usage of most courts and the Restatement. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). There are some courts that 
use the term "third party beneficiary" to mean a third party who can enforce a contract. See, e.g., In 
re Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., No. 08-13555, 2014 WL 2766164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 18, 
2014) ("Under New York law, a party claiming to be a third-party beneficiary of a contract bears 
the burden of demonstrating that the parties to the contract intended to confer a benefit on the third 
party." (emphasis added)). 
15. SUZANNE DARROW-KLEJNHAUS, ACJNG CONTRACTS 335-36 (2010) ("[T]he 'promisor' is the 
contracting party who is to render the performance to the beneficiary and the 'promisee' is the 
contracting party whose right to performance has been conferred on the beneficiary."). 
16. But cf Fargo (TV Series), WIK!PEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fargo [https://perma.cc/ 
7WXH-6LRT] (noting each episode of the TV series Fargo begins with the superimposed text, 
"This is a true story."). 
17. See Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn. 2012) (defining 
intended third party beneficiary as "intended beneficiary with legal rights under a contract," relying 
on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 302 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). The result would be 
the same if the subject matter of the contract were the sale of a butcher shop in England such as 
Flackies of Luttenworth, Leicestershire. See FLACKIES OF LUTTENWORTH, http://flackies.net/ 
[https://perma.cc/KTS6-TBDX]. In November of 1999, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999 came into effect in England, allowing a third party to enforce a contract term if "the term 
purports to confer a benefit on him." See Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 c. 31, § 1 (I) 
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At present, Noreen's contract law rights turn on intent. Any doctrine 
based on intent is inherently ambiguous from the start. In third party 
beneficiary cases, ambiguity is especially problematic because of 
unanswered questions about: (1) whose intent is relevant; and (2) what 
the relevant intent is. 
Hence the cases are widely divided as to outcome. 18 And, 
collectively, these cases present an analytic mess in dire need of a 
cleanup. This paper undertakes that project. It is an attempt to clean up 
the doctrine as well as to answer its basic questions. That project, we 
contend, requires a different vocabulary and, more importantly, a 
different analytical approach-an approach that focuses on practical 
consequences. 
The primary practical consequence of determining that Noreen is an 
"intended third party beneficiary" is that Noreen becomes an additional 
possible plaintiff on the contract entered into by Ed and Bud. And 
determining that Noreen is an additional possible plaintiff can have 
possible practical consequences to the person she sues for breach of 
contract. Accordingly, the operative question should be whether Ed and 
Bud had reason to know at the time of their contract that Noreen could 
be an additional possible plaintiff ("APP"). Our approach substitutes an 
"APP" for third party beneficiary. 
To be clear, we do not contend that our approach will eliminate 
litigation over whether a person who was not a party to a contract can 
nonetheless sue for breach of that contract. Nor do we contend that it 
will necessarily effect significant changes in the results of such 
litigation. Rather, our claim is that our approach should simplify the 
litigation process and should produce litigation results more consistent 
with generally accepted contract concepts. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the development 
of third party beneficiary law. Part II looks to recent cases to illustrate 
problems with the present third party beneficiary law. Part III explains 
our proposed analytical framework. 
(Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/31/pdfs/ukpga_l 999003 l_en.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/4QGE-CN9B]; see generally ROBERT MERKIN, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: THE IMPACT OF THE 
CONTRACTS (RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) ACT 1999 (2000). 
18. The cases are even divided as to whether the term is "third party beneficiary" or "third-party 
beneficiary." Indeed, sometimes the same judge seems to be "divided," using both terms in the same 
opinion. See, e.g., J.C. Penney Properties, Inc. v. Hiram LL, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-02984-CC, 2016 
WL 302095 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2016). Most cases and commentaries use the term "third party 
beneficiary" and so does this article. 
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I. AN EXPLANATION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY LAW: 
HOW WE GOT TO WHERE WE ARE 
Generally, a person has no legal right to enforce a contract they 19 did 
not make. Courts and commentators invoke the contract concept of 
privity to explain this general rule. 
A. Privity 
An article by Jesse W. Lilienthal, 20 in the first issue of the Harvard 
Law Review, provides a short and easy-to-understand21 working 
explanation of privity: 
PERHAPS the tradition in the elementary law of contracts most 
thoroughly grounded in the minds of law students is the general 
proposition that an agreement between A and B cannot be sued 
upon by C, even though C would be benefited by its 
performance. It always was, with Harvard law students at all 
events, an article of faith that rights founded on contract belong 
to the person who has stipulated for them; and that even the 
most express agreement of contracting parties would not confer 
any right of action on the contract upon one not a party thereto. 22 
Lilienthal's statement is followed by three items: (1) a footnote from 
the law review editors explaining that "[t]his doctrine [privity] is not 
taught in the School at the present day"; 23 (2) an attempt at explaining 
the case that "exploded"24 the privity rule, Lawrence v. Fox;25 and (3) 
repeated efforts to explain later courts' application of Lawrence v. Fox. 26 
19. Jeff Guo, Sorry, Grammar Nerds. The Singular 'They" Has Been Declared Word of the Year, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/0l/08/donald-
trump-may-win-this-years-word-of-the-year/ [https://perma.cc/B2Y8-7P77]. 
20. Despite contributing only one article to third party beneficiary law, Jesse Lilienthal was an 
uncommonly accomplished and interesting person. See LILLIE BERNHEIMER LILIENTHAL, IN 
MEMORIAM: JESSE WARREN LILIENTHAL (1921), https://archive.org/details/inmemoriamjessew 
OO!iliiala [https://perma.cc/CEZ7-WLAA]. 
21. For a more complete (and complex) explanation of privity, see generally MICHAEL 
FURMSTON & GREGORY TOLHURST, PRIVITY OF CONTRACTS (2015); VERNON VALENTINE 
PALMER, THE PATHS TO PRIVITY (1992). 
22. Jesse W. Lilienthal, Privity of Contracts, 1 HARV. L. REV. 226, 226 (1887). 
23. Id. at 226 n.1. This footnote inserted by the student editors is consistent with the surprisingly 
conversational tone of the article-very different from the tone of the articles in volume 129. 
24. Id. at 226. But cf ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 778 (1951) [hereinafter 
CORBIN] ("It is sometimes believed that all that is necessary to bring the third party into 'privity' 
with the promisor is that the contract shall be expressly made for his benefit."). 
25. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). 
26. Lilienthal, supra note 22, at 226. 
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"At present day," privity is no longer taught at most law schools-not 
just "the School"27 --except in answering the question of when third 
parties can enforce warranties of quality in sale of goods contracts made 
by others. Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 
answers this question. 28 
Our paper does not deal with section 2-318 of the UCC. Section 2-
318 has been fully explored and explained by other articles. 29 Courts 
have comparatively few problems applying section 2-318 to determine 
whether a person who was not a party to a sale of goods contract can still 
·recover for breach of a UCC warranty. Section 2-318's answers30 to the 
question of when third parties can enforce warranties arising from sale 
of goods contracts31 made by others are based on a public policy of 
balancing the protection of third parties from defective products, and the 
protection of sellers from unlimited liability. Section 2-318 does not 
look to the intention of the parties and is not based on cases like 
Lawrence v. Fox. 32 
Courts continue to have problems applying the common law's 
answers to the question of when third parties have rights under 
contracts-answers based on the intention of the parties and cases like 
Lawrence v. Fox. And so, like Jesse Lilienthal in volume 1 of the 
Harvard Law Review, we first try to explain Lawrence v. Fox. 
27. There are contracts casebooks that do not even have an index entry for "privity." See, e.g., 
RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2008); DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL & 
LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CONTRACTS: MAKING AND DOING DEALS (4th ed. 2014). The absence of 
"privity" from the index is more of a commentary on the "quality" of the index prepared by one of 
the co-authors than the book's coverage of third party beneficiary law prepared by a different one of 
the co-authors. 
28. U.C.C. § 2-318 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002). 
29. See, e.g., David G. Epstein, Strict Liability in Tort: A Modest Proposal, 70 W. VA. L. REv 1, 
7-11 (1967). 
30. UCC § 2-318 provides three alternative balances. Happily, an article comparing the various 
versions of the Uniform Commercial Code's section 2-318 with the various versions of the common 
law of third party beneficiary has already been written. See Gary Monserud, Blending the Law of 
Sales with the Common law of Third Party Beneficiary, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 111 (2000). 
31. We use the qualifying term "arising from sale of goods contracts" because neither UCC § 2-
314's implied warranty of merchantability nor UCC § 2-315's implied warranty of fitness depends 
on the intention of the parties. U.C.C. §§ 2-314-15 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2002). 
32. In a review of section 2-318, the Permanent Editorial Board Study Group called the third 
party beneficiary analysis for extension of warranties "a fiction." PERMANENT EDITORIAL Bo. FOR 
THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, AM. LAW INST. & NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2: PRELIMINARY 
REPORT, pt. 3, at 110 (1990). 
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B. Lawrence v. Fox 
Most law review commentaries begin the discussion of third party 
beneficiary law with the facts 33 of Lawrence v. Fox, 34 an 185935 case. 
Often referred to as the "landmark" third party beneficiary case, 36 
Lawrence v. Fox involved a third party who was a creditor of the 
prornisee and was expressly named in the contract. Lawrence had loaned 
$300 to Holly. 37 The next day, Holly loaned the same amount of money 
to Fox. 38 In return, Fox agreed to repay the $300 loan from Holly by 
paying Lawrence, thus extinguishing Holly's $300 debt to Lawrence.39 
When Fox failed to pay the $300 to Lawrence, Lawrence sued Fox for 
breach of contract. 40 The jury found for the plaintiff Lawrence. A 
divided Court of Appeals affmned. 41 
There was no dispute about intent in Lawrence v. Fox. The only fact 
disputed by the defendant Fox was the existence of Holly's debt to the 
plaintiff Lawrence. 42 The appellate court concluded that there was 
"clearly competent" evidence of this debt. 43 
The dispute in Lawrence v. Fox was over the legal significance of an 
undisputed fact-that Lawrence was not a party to the contract, i.e., "the 
33. Professor Lawrence Cunningham explains why he begins his discussion of third party 
beneficiary law: "[ e Jach formulation of a legal rule depends on the facts of the case germinating the 
rule .... " Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Common Law as an Iterative Process, 81 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 747, 750 (2006). 
34. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). 
35. 1859 was thus not only the year for On the Origin of the Species but also the origins of third 
party beneficiary law. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES (1859). 
36. Schaefer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 910 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 n.14 (D. Md. 1986); JOSEPH 
M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 578 (6th ed. 2009). But see CORBIN, supra note 
24, at § 827. ("Lawrence v. Fox, can hardly ... be said to have created a new rule of law."). Of 
course, a case can be a "landmark" even though it does not create a new rule of law. Consider, for 
example, the law review descriptions of Alaska Packers' Ass 'n. v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 
1902), an opinion that not only relies on but liberally quotes from two prior cases. Paul F. Kirgis, 
Bargaining with Consequences, Leverage and Coercion in Negotiations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 
69, 123 (2014) (describing Alaska Packers as the "most famous case of this type"); Rachel Arnow-
Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment Relationship, I 0 TEX. WESLEY AN L. 
REv. 1, 7 (2003) ("chestnut case"). 
37. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 269. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. For an extended discussion of the facts of Lawrence v. Fox, see Anthony Jon Waters, The 
Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 
1116-48 (1985). 
42. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 269. 
43. Id. at 270. 
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want of privity between the plaintiff and defendant."44 The defendant 
Fox contended that under New York law, only a contract party could 
maintain an action on a contract, except in the case of a trust. 45 The 
majority opinion rejects this contention, stating "a promise made to one 
for the benefit of another, he for whose benefit it is made may bring an 
action for its breach"46 and concludes, "if ... a more strict and 
technically accurate application of the rules would lead to a different 
result ... the effort should not be made in the face of manifest justice."47 
The opinion does not provide a legal principle based explanation for 
its less "strict and technically accurate application of the rules" of privity 
or when courts should be less "strict and technically accurate."48 What is 
the "manifest justice" of Lawrence's claim? Is it anything more than that 
a debt was owed to him, and the contract between Fox and 'Holly 
provided for the payment of that debt? 
The "manifest justice" in Lawrence v. Fox becomes more 
understandable by slightly changing the facts. Assume that Lawrence 
National Bank makes a home loan to Holly. Fox later buys the house 
from Holly and agrees to assume the mortgage, i.e., Fox promises to 
make the mortgage payments to Lawrence National Bank. 
If Fox later breaches this contract with Holly and fails to make the 
mortgage payments to Lawrence National Bank, Lawrence National 
Bank has contract-law rights under this contract it did not make. A rule 
recognizing the contract rights of a third party when that party is a 
creditor of the promisee and is expressly named in the contract is easy to 
understand, and easy to apply. This is "manifest justice." 
There is nothing in the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Fox to 
suggest that it should be limited to creditor third parties. And there are 
later New York cases recognizing the contract rights of third parties 
44. Id. at 271. 
45. Id. at 270 (based on a narrow reading of an earlier case, Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825), ajj"d, 9 Cow. 639 (N.Y. 1827)), 
46. Id. at 274-75, In a concurring opinion, two of the six justices in the majority stated a different 
basis for the decision. Id. at 275. Holly was making the contract as an agent for Lawrence and since 
Lawrence was a disclosed principal, Lawrence could enforce the contract. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY§ 292 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) .. 
47. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 275 (emphasis added). 
48. Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280, 284 (1887) ("Judges have differed as to the principle upon 
which Lawrence v. Fox and kindred cases rest."). 
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other than creditors. The most frequently referenced of these cases49 is 
Seaver v. Ransom. 50 
C. Seaver v. Ransom 
In the 1918 New York case Seaver v. Ransom, Miss Seaver, the third 
party, was the niece of the promisee, Mrs. Beman. 51 The promisee's 
husband, Judge Beman, made "an unqualified promise on a valuable 
consideration to make provision for the third party by will." 52 Later 
Judge Beman "came to die" 53 and, notwithstanding the promise to his 
wife, his will made no provision for her niece. 54 The third party niece 
sued Ransom, the representative of Judge Beman's estate, alleging 
breach of contract by Judge Beman. 55 
The Court of Appeals relied on Lawrence v. Fox and its progeny in 
ruling for the third party niece. 56 In an effort to distill a doctrinal test 
from these cases, the court identified four classes of cases in which the 
New York courts had recognized third party contract rights and found 
room in one of the classes for Miss Seaver. 
Three57 of the Seaver v. Ransom categories focused on the 
relationship between the promisee and the third party: (1) cases like 
Lawrence v. Fox in which there was a debtor-creditor relationship 
between the promisee and the beneficiary; (2) cases in which the 
promisee had both a donative intent and a close family relationship with 
the third party; and (3) cases described as "public contracts'', i.e., 
49. See CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROLL. CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 
1107-16 (2010) ("Third-party beneficiary doctrine developed from the two early New York cases 
below." (Lawrence v. Fox and Seaver v. Ransom)). 
50. 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918). 
51. Id. at 642. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 640. 
54. Id. at 639-40. 
55. Id. at 640. 
56. Cf Douglass G. Boshkoff, More Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts: Raintree County 
Memorial Library Occasional Paper No. 2, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 295, 301 (1996) (And ifthere ever 
has been an appropriate footnote for the use of"cf", this is it.). 
Beman, J. failed to honor his word 
To his wife for the good of a third. 
When the court made him pay, 
The old judge had his say. 
'But for Fox, this would not have occurred.' 
57. Seaver describes the fourth category as "cases where, at the request of a party to the contract, 
the promise runs directly to the beneficiary although he does not furnish the consideration." 120 
N.E. at 641. 
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contracts that a government entity made to "protect its inhabitants by 
covenants for their benefit."58 One of the "public contract" cases cited 
by Seaver v. Ransom involved a contract between a village and a private 
water company to provide water to the residents of the village. 59 The 
court placed Miss Seaver in the second category and labeled her a 
"donee beneficiary."60 This is a term that is still in use and warrants 
further explanation. 
Just as the assumed home mortgage is a clearer paradigm for creditor 
beneficiaries than Lawrence v. Fox, a life insurance contract is a clearer 
paradigm for donee beneficiaries than Seaver v. Ransom. Assume that 
Mrs. Beman instead uses "valuable consideration" to buy life insurance 
from the Ransom Life Insurance Co. (RLI). The life insurance policy, a 
contract between Mrs. Beman and RLI, names Mrs. Beman's niece, 
Miss Seaver, as the beneficiary. If RLI breaches this contract with Mrs. 
Beman by failing to make the promised policy benefits payment to Miss 
Seaver, then Miss Seaver has contract law rights under the life insurance 
contract she did not make. A rule recognizing the contract rights of a 
third party who was a donee of the promisee when that party was 
expressly named in the contract is easy to understand, and easy to apply. 
Around this time, courts in states other than New York were writing 
about contract rights of third parties.61 And so were the two leading 
contracts law professors of the era, Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin. 
D. Williston and Corbin 
Williston wrote about contract rights of third parties in a 1902 law 
review article 62 and in his 1920 treatise on contracts. 63 Williston began 
his 1902 article with the following quote: 
In no department of the law has a more obstinate and persistent 
battle between practice and theory been waged than in regard to 
the answer to the question: Whether a right of action accrues to a 
third person from a contract made by others for his benefit? Nor 
is the strife ended; for if it be granted that the scale inclines in 
58. Id. at 640-41. 
59. Id. at 640; see Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 76 N.E. 211 (N.Y. 1906). 
60. Id. at 642. 
61. See, e.g., W. H. Page, Beneficiary Contracts in Wisconsin, I WISC. L. REv. 216 (1922). 
62. Samuel Williston, Contracts for the Benefit ofa Third Person, 15 HARV. L. REV. 767 (1902). 
63. E.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 381 et seq. (1920) [hereinafter 
WILLISTON]. There are three later editions of this book. The 1920 edition is the only edition 
authored solely by Williston. All our references to "Williston" will be to this first edition. 
1674 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1663 
favor of practice, yet the advocates of this result are continually 
endeavoring to extend the territory which they have conquered 
and to apply the doctrines thereby established to cases which 
should be governed by other principles. 64 
In our opinion, Williston's primary "other principle" was privity. 
Unlike Lilienthal, Williston did not believe that privity had been 
"exploded" by Lawrence v. Fox. 65 Because of privity, Williston viewed 
recognition of third party contract rights as a theoretical "anomaly."66 In 
both his article and his treatise, Williston grudgingly supported contract 
rights for donee beneficiaries, 67 some creditor beneficiaries, 68 and some 
persons who benefit from contract with a municipality. 69 
Corbin expressed a very different view of privity and third party 
contract rights in six law review articles published from 1916 to 1930.70 
The first of Corbin's articles begins: 
By the great weight of authority in the United States the same 
facts that operate to create contractual relations between the 
offeror and the acceptor may also operate to create rights in a 
third person .... To many students and practitioners of the 
common law privity of contract became a fetish. As such, it 
operated to deprive many a claimant of a remedy in cases where 
according to the mores of the time the claim was just. 71 
64. Williston, supra note 62, at 767. 
65. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 357 ("The beneficiary is not a party to a contract, and apart from 
some special principal (sic) governing this class of cases cannot maintain an action."). 
66. Discussion of Tentative Draft, Contracts, Restatement No. 3, 5 AL.I. PROC. 373, 385 (1927). 
In his treatise, Williston characterized the rights of third parties to contracts as equitable, not legal. 
WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 358. ("Common-Jaw procedure contemplates but two sides to a case, 
and cannot well deal with more. Equity can deal successfully with any number of conflicting 
interests in one case .... "). 
67. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 357; Williston, supra note 62, at 772. 
68. WILLISTON, supra note 63, §§ 361-63; Williston, supra note 62, at 772. 
69. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 373; Williston, supra note 62, at 772. According to Williston, 
these contracts between a private party and a municipality should be analyzed differently from 
contracts between two private parties. Id. at 784 ("[T]he object of the promise is to benefit the 
community as a whole, and the city as the representative of the community is the proper plaintiff."). 
70. Arthur Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J. 1008, 1008 (1918) 
[hereinafter Corbin, Third Persons]; Arthur Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons in 
Connecticut, 31 YALE L.J. 489, 490-492 (1922); Arthur Corbin, The Law of Third Party 
Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania, 77 U. PA. L. REV. I, 3 (1928) [hereinafter Corbin, Beneficiaries in 
Pennsylvania]; Arthur Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surety Bonds, 38 
YALE L.J. I, 2-3 (1928); Arthur Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 46 LAW Q. 
REV. 12, 12 (1930); Arthur Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons in the Federal 
Courts, 39 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1930). 
71. Corbin, Third Persons, supra note 70, at 1008. 
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In these law review articles, Corbin advocated: (1) the total 
abandonment of a privity requirement; 72 (2) the same legal treatment for 
creditor and donee beneficiaries; 73 and (3) intent of the contracting 
parties as the test for third party contract rights. 74 Additionally, Corbin 
proselytized for the judicial acceptance of the Restatement of Contracts 
position on contract rights of third parties. 75 
E. First Restatement 
Williston was the reporter for the Restatement of Contracts. 76 Corbin 
was given the title of "Special Adviser." 77 
Legal scholars are divided as to whether Chapter 6 of the 
Restatement-"Contractual Rights of Persons Not Parties to the 
Contract"-is based on the views of Williston or the views of Corbin. 78 
We believe that it can be read as a fusion of Williston and Corbin's 
views. 
On the surface, the Restatement seems simply to mirror Williston's 
treatise. The Restatement, like Williston's treatise, employed categories 
to identify third parties with contract rights-seemingly, the same 
categories as Williston's: donee beneficiaries and creditor beneficiaries 
under private contracts covered in Restatement section 133, 79 and 
beneficiaries under service contracts made with villages or other 
governmental entities covered in Restatement section 145. 80 
72. Corbin, Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania, supra note 70, at 3 ("[I]t is time to abandon the 
repetition of the misleading doctrine."). 
73. Id. at 21 ("[T]he question is where to draw the line between beneficiaries with rights and third 
parties as to whom performance might be beneficial but who have no rights."). 
74. Corbin, Third Persons, supra note 70, at 1009 ("The reasons for recognizing the rights in the 
contract beneficiary are substantially the same as those recognizing the rights of a cestui que trust. 
By so doing, the intention of the parties is carried out and the beneficiary's just expectations are 
fulfilled." (first emphasis added)). 
75. Corbin, Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania, supra note 70, at 2-3. 
76. Discussion of Tentative Draft, supra note 66, at 373. 
77. See Bibliography of the Published Writings of Arthur Linton Corbin, 74 YALE L.J. 311, 320 
(1964). 
78. Compare Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1376 ("followed the view of Williston"), with 
FREDERICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1362 (3d ed. 1986) ("almost certainly the handiwork of Arthur Corbin"). But cf 
Waters, supra note 41, at 1166--67 ("Corbin claims ... that his views prevailed over Williston in the 
formulation of the chapters on third party beneficiaries in the First Restatement."). 
79. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
80. The last category, government, is dealt with separately from the other two. See id. § 145. 
RESTATEMENT § 145, like Seaver v. Ransom, uses the example of a private company's contracting 
with a municipality to provide sufficient water to maintain needed pressure in fire hydrants. Id. 
1676 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1663 
Neither the text of Restatement section 145, nor the "Comment" or 
"Illustrations" following it, use the terms "creditor beneficiary" or 
"donee beneficiary." The comment to section 145 describes it as a 
"special application of the principles stated in section 133."81 Both the 
illustrations to section 145 and later cases suggest that, at best, section 
145 governing third party rights under "government contracts"82 is a 
"[very, very] special application of the principles stated in Restatement 
section 133"83 that govern third party rights under private contracts. 
One of section 145's illustrations is similar to a case included in many 
contracts casebooks, H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 84 There, 
the City of Rensselaer contracted with the defendant water company to 
provide enough water to have sufficient water pressure at the hydrant. 85 
The plaintiffs warehouse burned down because the defendant failed to 
maintain adequate pressure. The plaintiff sued, alleging, inter alia, "[a] 
cause of action for breach of contract within Lawrence v. Fox."86 The 
court, in an opinion by Judge Cardozo, rejected the third party 
beneficiary claim. 87 
Although Cardozo's H.R. Moch opinion mentions Lawrence v. Fox, 88 
all of the cases it discussed and relied on involved government contracts. 
The same statement can be made about Astra USA Inc. v. Santa Clara 
County, 89 a 2011 United States Supreme Court decision denying the 
right to bring a breach of contract action as third party beneficiaries of a 
contract between federal government and drug manufacturers. 
Courts treat third parties' suits to enforce government contracts 
differently from third parties' suits to enforce contracts between private 
parties. 90 This Article focuses on what courts do and should do when a 
third party sues to enforce a contract between private parties. 
81. Id.§ 145 cmt. a. 
82. The government contracts that raise third party issues are different from the typical 
government contract, which is simply a procurement contract---e.g., government entity contracts to 
buy widgets. Third party issues arise in the atypical contract in which a government entity contracts 
with a private entity to provide services to the public. See id. § 145 cmt. a, illus. 1-5. 
83. Id. § 145 cmt. a (emphasis added). 
84. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928). 
85. Id. at 896. 
86. Id. at 897. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 898. 
89. 563 U.S. 110 (2011). 
90. GECCMC 2005-Cl Plummer St. Office Ltd. P'ship. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat'! Ass'n, 
671F.3d1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2012) ("[H]eightened standard required of third-party beneficiaries to 
government contracts."); see also Geis, supra note 9, at 1157 n.20 (Government contracts "present 
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Under the First Restatement, a third party has contract rights under a 
contract made by other private parties if they were a "creditor 
beneficiary" or a "donee beneficiary."91 If the third party does not come 
within the Restatement's "creditor beneficiary" or "donee beneficiary" 
categories, then she is in the "incidental beneficiary" category and has 
no contract law rights. 92 
On a closer reading of the Restatement's description of "donee 
beneficiary," in section 133(1)(a), we see Corbin's influence. Even 
though "donee beneficiary" is a term used in Williston's treatise and in 
cases such as Seaver v. Ransom, the Restatement uses the term "donee 
beneficiary" differently. 93 
Under Restatement section 133(l)(a), a third party has contract rights 
if "it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying 
circumstances that the purpose of the promisee ... is to make a gift to 
the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor."94 
Thus, a third party who was not a donee would still have contract rights 
if a reasonable person would believe that was "the purpose of the 
pro mi see. "95 
While section 133 does not use the term "reasonable person," it does 
use the word "appears."96 The First Restatement is making an objective 
test for intent-an outsider's view of the promisee's purpose. 
This focus on the intent of a contracting party, rather than the status of 
the third party, is consistent with what Corbin advocated in his six law 
review articles that preceded the first Restatement. The Restatement 
different legal issues from private contracting and involve considerations more closely related to the 
determination of private rights of action in statutory interpretation."). But cf Eisenberg, supra note 
8, at 1406--07 (acknowledging that courts treat suits by third parties under government contracts as 
"special" and raise "particularly difficult third-party beneficiary problems" but concluding "[t]here 
is no more reason to apply a categorical rule to government contracts than to any other contracts."). 
91. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 133-35 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
92. Id. §§ 133(1)(c), 147. 
93. The Restatement also uses the term "creditor beneficiary" differently from Williston and prior 
cases. In Lawrence v. Fox, the defendant promisor Fox moved for nonsuit on the ground "[t]hat 
there was no proof tending to show that Holly was indebted to the plaintiff." 20 N.Y 268, 269 
( 1859). The court found that there was competent evidence of the debtor-creditor relationship. Id. at 
270. No such finding was required by the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). A person can be a "creditor beneficiary" as that term is used in the 
Restatement even if she is not actually a creditor of the promise: a "supposed or asserted duty" 
sufficed. Id. If Holly tells Fox that Holly owes Lawrence money and contracts with Fox to pay 
Lawrence, then Lawrence can enforce the contract regardless of whether Lawrence was actually 
Holly's creditor. 
94. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
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provisions are not, however, consistent with the case law in most states 
before the release of the First Restatement. In his multivolume treatise 
published in 1951, Corbin described the provisions as "working rules 
based upon the judicial 'trend"'97 and acknowledged that "it cannot be 
said that the rules represent the old 'common law' or that they are in 
exact harmony with the law of any jurisdiction."98 
Nor are the provisions of the First Restatement consistent with the 
case law in most states after the release of the First Restatement. 
Because of the Restatement's "creditor beneficiary" and "donee 
beneficiary" nomenclature, some courts recognized contract rights only 
in third parties who were indeed creditors or actual donees. 99 Still other 
courts found the Restatement provisions unhelpful in identifying which 
third parties, other than creditors and actual donees, had contract 
rights. 100 
F. Second Restatement 
In his 1951 treatise, Corbin suggested that the terms "creditor 
beneficiary" and "donee beneficiary" be replaced with the single term 
"intended beneficiary." 101 The Restatement Second of Contracts 
(hereinafter "Restatement Second") followed this suggestion. 102 
97. CORBIN, supra note 24, at 4. 
98. Id.; see also Ira P. Hildebrand, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties in Texas, 9 TEXAS L. 
REV. 125 (1931). 
99. See, e.g., Insbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291 of Int'! Longshoremen's Ass'n, 204 F.2d 495, 498 
(3d Cir. 1953) (holding that third party was not a donee beneficiary because "this fact 
situation ... completely negatives a gift transaction under any possible interpretation of that term."); 
United States v. Minnesota, 123 F. Supp. 488, 497 (D. Minn. 1953); see also JOHN EDWARD 
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 853 (5th ed. 20ll) ("Because of the 'donee' 
characterization, however, the ... beneficiary under this category who was not a true 'donee' could 
be easily ignored by courts who would limit this compartment to third parties who could 
demonstrate a promisee's donative intent."). 
100. See, e.g., Moore Constr. Co. v. Clarksville Dept. of Elec., 707 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1985) (noting that the Tennessee Supreme Court had adopted the Restatement position on third 
party beneficiaries, and stating, "[t]his process, however, has not been uniformly acceptable, and 
there have been a number of cases where this rationale has been ignored in order to enable the court 
to permit a person to maintain an action as a third party beneficiary."); Gary Monserud, supra note 
30, at 122("(W]hatever its deficiencies, section 133 of the Restatement First and its related sections 
performed an enormous service for contract law. The widespread hesitancy about allowing third 
party suits on contracts ... disappeared .... The recurring question was: In what type of case is 
allowing a third party beneficiary suit appropriate?"). 
10 I. CORBIN, supra note 24, at 8 ("It might be supposed that the one essential classification of 
beneficiaries should be 'intended' beneficiaries and 'unintended' ones."). 
102. For an account of Corbin's role in and impact on the American Law Institute's work on third 
party beneficiary law, see Waters, supra note 7, at 1148-73. Unfortunately, Corbin's account of his 
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The introductory note to the Restatement Second's chapter 14, 
"Contract Beneficiaries," states that the terms "creditor beneficiary" and 
"donee beneficiary" "carry overtones of obsolete doctrinal difficulties" 
and so the terms "are avoided in the statement of rules." 103 Instead, the 
operative terms are "intended beneficiary" and "incidental 
beneficiary." 104 
If a third party comes within the definition of "intended beneficiary," 
she has contract rights. 105 Section 302 provides the following definition 
of "intended beneficiary": 
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a 
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition 
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to 
effectuate the intention of the parties and either 
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of 
the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or 
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give 
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. 106 
There is also language in comment d 107 to Restatement 302 that seems 
to suggest that a third party's reasonable reliance is a basis for 
role in and impact on the American Law Institute's work on third party beneficiary law has been 
lost. See generally Scott D. Gerber, An Ivy League Mystery: The Lost Papers of Arthur Linton 
Corbin, 53 S.C. L. REV. 605 (2002). 
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 14, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981). In 
looking at third party beneficiary law at about the same time as the American Law Institute, 
Professors Grant Gilmore and Frederick Kessler saw the social evolution, not doctrine or rules: 
In our own century we have witnessed what it does not seem too fanciful to describe as a 
socialization of our theory of contract. The progressive expansion of the range of non-parties 
allowed to sue as contract beneficiaries ... is one of the entries to make in this ledger. 
FREDERICK KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1118 (2d ed. 
1970). 
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 14, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
105. Id. § 304. 
106. Id. § 302 (emphasis added). 
107. Id. § 302 cmt. d ("Other intended beneficiaries. Either a promise to pay the promisee's debt 
to a beneficiary or a gift promise involves a manifestation of intention by the promisee and promisor 
sufficient, in a contractual setting, to make reliance by the beneficiary both reasonable and probable. 
Other cases may be quite similar in this respect. Examples are a promise to perform a supposed or 
asserted duty of the promisee, a promise to discharge a lien on the promisee's property, or a promise 
to satisfy the duty of a third person. In such cases, if the beneficiary would be reasonable in relying 
on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary. 
Where there is doubt whether such reliance would be reasonable, considerations of procedural 
convenience and other factors not strictly dependent on the manifested intention of the parties may 
affect the question whether under Subsection (I) recognition of a right in the beneficiary is 
appropriate. In some cases an overriding policy, which may be embodied in a statute, requires 
recognition of such a right without regard to the intention of the parties.") (second emphasis added). 
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concluding that the third party is an "intended beneficiary." We believe 
that this language in comment d is relatively insignificant for the 
following reasons: 
The word "reliance" does not appear in the text of section 302. 
The comments appended to a Restatement section, like the comments 
to a statute such as the Uniform Commercial Code, have a limited 
purpose-explanation of what is in the black letter of the section. 108 
The words of comment d do not support the proposition that a third 
party's reliance on one of the contracting parties' promise is a separate 
basis for the third party's contract rights. Instead they seem to say that 
such reliance is a basis for concluding that the contracting parties 
intended to benefit the third party: "[I]f the beneficiary would be 
reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to 
confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary." 109 
We use the weasel word "seem" because we are somewhat uncertain 
in our understanding of the quoted words and are even less certain as to 
how the reliance of C to the words of A and B provides an independent 
basis for ascertaining A and B's intent. 
The Restatement Second separates contract rights based on the 
bargain of two parties from contract rights based on the reliance of one 
person. 110 
Restatement Second section 90, discussing promissory estoppel, 
provides an independent basis for granting third parties contract rights 
because of their reliance. Section 90 begins: "A promise which the 
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on 
the part of the promisee or a third party ... is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 111 
Thus, if the promisee or a third party relies on Restatement Second 
section 90, they can recover only if they can prove not only reasonable 
reliance but also "injustice." 112 Comment d to Restatement Second 
108. AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK 
FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 42 (rev. ed. 2015). 
109. Id. 
110. In essence, Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 17 sets out two different bases for 
contract: bargain and reliance. Compare section 17(1) with section 17(2): "(!) Except as stated in 
Subsection (2), the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of 
mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration. (2) Whether or not there is a bargain a contract 
may be formed under special rules applicable to formal contracts or under the rules stated in §§ 82-
94." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
111. Id. § 90 (emphasis added). 
112. Id. 
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section 302 makes no mention of "injustice." 113 It should not be easier 
for a third party to recover because of reliance under Restatement 
Second section 302 than for either a third party or a promisee to recover 
because of reliance under Restatement Second section 90. 
For the above seven reasons, this Article deals only with third party 
contract rights based on the bargain between two other parties. 114 
Returning then to our focus on the language of section 302 set out 
above, we think it is instructive to compare the two underscored phrases: 
intention of the parties and promisee' s intent. The difference in the two 
phrases creates the question of whose intention is relevant: "the parties" 
or "the promisee." 
Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, one of the reporters for the 
Restatement Second, acknowledged, "[i]n view of the Restatement 
Second' s requirement that a right in the beneficiary be 'appropriate to 
effectuate the intention of the parties,' its additional requirement that the 
promisee have an intention to benefit the third person seems curious at 
first." 115 He then suggests that the phrase "promisee intends" be 
''paraphrased to require an indication 'that the promisee would have 
been willing to pay the fair value for the promisor' s undertaking a duty 
to the beneficiary. "'116 
We are not sure that Professor Farnsworth was using the term 
"paraphrase" in the same way we do. We are sure that no reported case 
has used Professor Farnsworth's "paraphrase." 
Some paraphrasing may in fact be necessary to bring Restatement 
Second section 302 in line with the objective theory of contract 
formation and interpretation. 117 Compare both of the subjective 
underscored phrases in Restatement Second section 302, "intention of 
the parties" and "promisee intends," 118 with the objective Restatement 
First section 133 phrase "appears from the terms of the promise in view 
of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee." 119 
113. Id. at cmt. d. 
114. For an article on third party contract rights based on promissory estoppel, see Michael B. 
Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third Parties, 42 Sw. L.J. 931 (1988). 
115. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 23 (2d ed. 1998). 
116. Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
117. For the most part, contract law looks to the objective intent, rather than subjective intent. 
See, e.g., Indus. Arn., Inc. v. Fulton Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 412, 415 (Del. 1971) ("[O]vert 
manifestation of assent-not subjective intent-controls the formation of a contract."); see 
generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEA TH OF CONTRACT 42-43 (2d ed. 1995). 
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 302 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
119. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
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The words "appears," "terms," and "circumstances" in the 
Restatement First are consistent with an objective test of the prornisee's 
intent: what would a reasonable person understand the prornisee to 
intend? The words "the intention" in Restatement Second section 302 
are more consistent with a subjective inquiry into the actual intent of the 
parties (or prornisee ). 
Some courts have stated that omission of the terms "creditor 
beneficiary" and "donee beneficiary" is the only difference between 
Restatement Second section 302 and Restatement First section 133. 120 
Even more courts have continued to use the Restatement First terms 
"creditor beneficiary" and "donee beneficiary."121 There are of course 
cases that use Restatement Second's "intended beneficiary" and 
"incidental beneficiary" language. 
Regardless of what language courts use, it is difficult to reconcile 
courts' resolution of cases in which the understanding of both parties to 
the contract is less obvious than in Lawrence v. Fox and Seaver v. 
Ransom. There is little consistency in those cases because of the inherent 
vagueness in the questions of (1) whose intent is relevant and (2) how 
that intent should be defined and proved. 
II. REVIEW OF CURRENT CASES: CONFUSION AS TO WHERE 
WEARE 
Where we are analytically with respect to third party contract rights 
depends very much on where the litigants are geographically. We 
120. See, e.g., Lake Almanor Assocs. L.P. v. Huffman-Broadway Grp., Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71, 
75 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) ("Section 302 of the Restatement Second of Contracts omits the terms 
'donee beneficiary' and 'creditor beneficiary,' instead employing the term 'intended beneficiary' for 
a beneficiary with enforceable rights and 'incidental beneficiary' for a beneficiary lacking such 
rights. However, the basic framework regarding which third parties can enforce contracts is 
unchanged.") (citation omitted); Lovell Land, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 969 A.2d 284, 297 
(Md. 2009) (The change made in the Second Restatement "was not one of substance, but only of 
terminology."); see also Prince, supra note 10, at 990 ("[M]any courts have not perceived any 
change."). 
121. See, e.g., MCI Telecoms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. 1999) 
(plaintiff must show that he is either a donee or a creditor beneficiary); Cory H. Howard, Towards a 
Broader Understanding of Privity Exceptions in Contract Law: Bestowing Limited Rights on 
Incidental Third Party Beneficiaries in Construction Litigation to Fulfill Public Policy Objectives, 
51 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 205 (2015-16) ("Most, if not all, common law recognizes two discrete 
categories of intended third-party beneficiaries who can enforce a contract to which they are not 
privily: (1) a donee beneficiary and (2) a creditor beneficiary."); see also 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON & 
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§§ 32-33 (4th ed. 2000) ("[T]he vast 
majority of courts continue to speak of third party creditor and third party donee beneficiaries when 
considering protected beneficiaries."); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 616 (4th 
ed. 2012) ("[R]emains embedded in the law of many jurisdictions .... "). 
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conducted a fifty state and federal court survey of cases from 2010 to 
January 1, 2016 that considered whether third parties had contract rights. 
We focused on the questions: (1) whose intent was relevant and (2) what 
intent was relevant. We also looked for differences between the damages 
earned by a third party beneficiary and the damages that would have 
been awarded to the prornisee of the contract. We found no discernible 
majority rules. 
A. Whose Intent Is Relevant? 
We divided the recent cases into three categories: (1) cases that focus 
on the prornisee's intent; (2) cases that focus on the prornisor's intent; 
and (3) cases that look to the intent of both the prornisor and the 
promisee. The following cases are representative of these three answers 
to the question: whose intent is relevant? 
1. Promisee 's Intent 
In Logan-Baldwin v. L.S.M General Contractors, Inc., 122 New York 
homeowners hired L.S.M. General Contractors, Inc. (LSM) to perform 
restorative work on their house. 123 LSM, in tum, hired Henry Isaacs, a 
subcontractor, to help with roofing. 124 Henry Isaacs then hired Hal 
Brewster to assist him with the project. 125 Unfortunately, Hal Brewster 
"botched" the job and caused extensive damage to the house. 126 LSM 
and Isaacs attempted to fix the damage, but ultimately abandoned the 
project, leaving the homeowners to address it themselves. 127 
The homeowners sued their general contractor LSM and 
subcontractor Isaacs for breach of contract. 128 While the homeowners 
received judgment against LSM, the court granted Isaacs's motion for 
summary judgment. 129 The appeal involved only Isaacs' summary 
judgment and the appellate court reversed and remanded. 130 
Isaacs contended that the homeowners did not have standing to 
enforce its subcontract with LSM because: (1) there was no privity of 
122. 94 A.D.3d 1466, 1466 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012). 
123. Id. at 1466-67. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 1467. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
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contract and (2) the homeowners were not intended third party 
beneficiaries of the subcontract between LSM and Isaacs. 131 The court 
held that the homeowners were intended third party beneficiaries to the 
contract, and therefore had standing against the promisee Isaacs. 132 
The opinion states that generally: 
An obligation rooted in contract may [nevertheless] engender a 
duty owed to those not in privity when the contracting party 
knows that the subject matter of a contract is intended for the 
benefit of others .... An intention to benefit a third party must 
be gleaned from the contract as a whole. 133 
Thus, privity is not always required. 
The opinion goes on to say that homeowners who are 
asserting third-party beneficiary rights under a contract must 
establish '(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract 
between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [the 
third party's] benefit and (3) that the benefit to [the third party] 
is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the 
assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate 
[the third party] if the benefit is lost.' 134 
The opinion states that the focus is solely on the intent of the 
promisee, LSM. 135 The explanation for focusing solely on the intent of 
the promisee was that "the promisee procured the promise by furnishing 
the consideration therefor." 136 · 
The opinion provides no explanation as to why the "promisee [LSM] 
furnishing the consideration therefor" 137 should affect the liability of the 
promisor, Isaacs. Instead, the court provides citations to prior opinions, 
which are no more fully reasoned, stating that the focus is on the intent 
of the promisees. 138 
The remainder of the opinion in this case is more enlightening. The 
court stated: "Here ... it is 'almost inconceivable' that the Isaacs 
defendants did not know that plaintiffs, the owners of the home, would 
131. Id. 
132. See id. at 1470. 
133. Id. at 1468 (quoting Van Vleet v. Rhulen Agency, 180 A.D.2d 846, 848-49 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1992)) (brackets in original). 
134. Id. (quoting Bums Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451N.E.2d459, 469 (N.Y 
1983)). 
135. Id. at 1468. 
136. Id. (quoting Drake v. Drake, 45 N.Y.S.2d 420, 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)). 
137. Id. at 1468. 
138. Id. 
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be the ultimate beneficiaries of the services being provided by the Isaacs 
defendants pursuant to their contract with LSM." 139 After stating that 
LSM's intent was determinative, the court focused on what the promisor 
Isaacs had reason to know at the time of the contract. 
2. Promisor 's Intent 
Several cases and a Michigan statute expressly focus on what the 
promisor had reason to know. Muhammad v. Pub. Storage Co. 140 is an 
example of a recent case stating that the promisor's intention is the one 
that is relevant to a third party beneficiary's status. 141 Muhammad 
concerned plaintiffs Wallace and Edna Muhammad who wanted to rent a 
storage unit. 142 They entered into an agreement with the defendant, 
Public Storage. Wallace Muhammad signed the contract with Public 
Storage as the "occupant."143 Edna Muhammad signed the contract as 
"occupant's authorized access person." 144 
Eventually, the Muhammads fell behind on payments, and by the end 
of January were nearly two months delinquent, owing $161 to Public 
Storage. 145 Public Storage then sold all of the items in the Muhammads' 
storage unit. 146 When the Muhammads attempted to get reimbursement 
for the near $200,000 worth of items sold, Public Storage refused, and 
the Muhammads sued. 147 Public Storage filed a motion to dismiss. 148 
The suit alleged several causes of action. 149 Count II, a breach of 
contract claim, is our only concem. 150 
Defendant Public Storage filed a motion to dismiss Edna 
Muhammad's breach of contract claim, contending that Edna 
Muhammad could not assert a claim for breach of contract because of 
lack of privity-she was not a party to the agreement with Public 
Storage. 151 In response, the Muhammads argued that Edna Muhammad 
139. Id. at 1469 (citations omitted). 
140. No. 14-0246-CV-W-ODS, 2014 WL 3687328 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 2014). 
141. Id. at *I. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at *1-2. 
148. Id. at *2. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at *4. 
151. Id. at *3. 
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could assert a claim for breach of contract as an intended third party 
beneficiary. 152 
The court rejected the Muhammads' argument and granted the Public 
Storage motion to dismiss Edna Muhammad's contract cause of 
action. 153 More important than the court's result is the court's reasoning, 
or lack thereof. The opinion states in pertinent part: "Third party 
beneficiary status depends not so much on a desire or purpose to confer 
a benefit on the third person, but rather on an intent that the promisor 
assume a direct obligation to him." 154 The court does not explain why 
the promisor's intent should be the determinative test. Instead, the court 
simply cites an earlier case, which is no more fully reasoned. 155 
In some cases, it is not the case law that directs whose intent is 
relevant, but a state statute. For example, Michigan's third party 
beneficiary statute provides: 
Any person for whose benefit a promise is made by way of 
contract, as hereinafter defined, has the same right to enforce 
said promise that he would have had if the said promise had 
been made directly to him as the promisee. 
A promise shall be construed to have been made for the benefit 
of a person whenever the promisor of said promise had 
undertaken to give or to do or refrain from doing something 
directly to or for said person. 156 
Recent cases applying this Michigan statute, such as Shathaia v. 
Travelers Causality Insurance Company of America, 157 are not helpful 
in understanding the policy basis for the statute. Shathaia involved a 
property insurance policy issued to a business entity. 158 The building at 
issue was insured but later destroyed in a fire. 159 The building belonged 
to the owner of the business entity, Shathaia, not the business entity that 
was a party to the insurance contract. 160 When Shathaia sued the 
152. Id. at *4. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. (quoting McKenzie v. Columbian Nat'! Title Ins. Co., 931 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1996)) (first emphasis added). 
155. Id. at 4 (referring to McKenzie, 931 S.W.2d 843). 
156. MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 600.1405 (2012). 
157. 984 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Mich. 2013). 
158. Id. at 714. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
2016] AN "APP" FOR THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES 1687 
insurance company, it asserted rights under the insurance contract, and 
the insurance company successfully moved for summary judgment. 161 
In concluding that Shathaia was not an intended third party 
beneficiary, the court looked to the "plain language" of the Michigan 
statute. Nothing in the opinion or the cases cited in the opinion, 
however, clarifies the reason for the Michigan statutory rule. 162 
3. Both Parties' Intent 
Lilley v. JP Morgan Chase 163 involved a contract between a mortgage 
lender and an appraiser. The Lilleys signed a mortgage contract with JP 
Morgan Chase Bank, NA ("Lender") in 2005. 164 Prior to approving the 
Lilleys' loan, Lender contracted with Ingram, a real estate appraiser, to 
appraise the home. 165 The Lilleys defaulted on their loan and sued 
Ingram, alleging that Ingram breached his contract with Lender by 
preparing an inflated appraisal of the home. 166 
Only Lender and Ingram were parties to the appraisal contract. 167 The 
Lilleys had to establish that they were intended third party beneficiaries 
of that contract in order to sue for the breach of contract between Lender 
and Ingram. 168 
The Court explained that the existence of third party beneficiary 
status is determined by examining the written contract. "The written 
contract must show that the contracting parties clearly intended to 
confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the third party." 169 The Court 
did not explain why it was the "contracting parties"' intent that was 
relevant and not merely the intent of the prornisee or the intent of the 
prornisor. Again, the opinion simply provided precedent, not policy. 
B. What Intent Is Relevant? 
Once an attorney representing a third party to a contract knows whose 
intent170 will be relevant in determining whether their client can enforce 
161. Id. 
162. Id at 722. 
163. 317P.3d470(UtahCt.App.2013). 
164. Id. at472. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 472 (emphasis added). 
170. Promisee, promisor, or both promisee and promisor. 
1688 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:1663 
that contract, they then confront the question of what intent is relevant. 
Most of the cases in our survey simply refer to an intent to benefit a third 
party. Other opinions seem to require an intent that the promisor assume 
a direct obligation to the third party. Still fewer courts refer to an intent 
that the third party have legal rights in the contract. 
I. Intent to Benefit the Third Party 
For example, in Tarr v. Narconon Fresh Start, 171 plaintiff Michael 
Tarr sued Narconon for breaching a drug rehabilitation contract. 172 
Michael alleged that: (1) Narconon promised a secular program based on 
medical science and counseling; and that (2) during his time in the 
Narconon program, he was required to study Scientology and participate 
in Scientology rituals, receiving counseling only on Scientology. 173 
Narconon filed a motion to dismiss based in part on the fact that 
Michael was not a contracting party, i.e., he lacked privity. Narconon 
had contracted with Mrs. Tarr, Michael's mother, who was seeking 
treatment for her twenty-four-year-old, heroin-addicted son. 174 
The court denied Narconon's motion to dismiss. 175 The court 
explained that "[u]nder Nevada law, a third party has standing to sue for 
breach of contract ( 1) if the agreement was formed with the intent to 
benefit a third party and (2) if the third party's reliance on the agreement 
was foreseeable." 176 The court found that Ms. Tarr's sole purpose had 
been to benefit her son. 177 And, since the drug rehabilitation program 
required Michael to travel to the Narconon facility, Michael's reliance 
on the contract was foreseeable. 178 
What the court did not explain was the reason for its rule. The opinion 
does, however, provide the requisite nexus between either the promisee 
Mrs. Tarr's intent and Narconon's liability to Michael, or Michael's 
reliance and Narconon's liability on a third party beneficiary theory. 179 
171. 72 F. Supp. 3d 1138 (D. Nev. 2014). 
172. Id. at 1140. 
173. Id. at 1139. 
174. Id. at 1142. 
175. Id. at 1139. 
176. Id. at 1142 (emphasis added). 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
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2. Intent to Assume a Direct Obligation 
Known Litigation Holdings, LLC v. Navigators Insurance, 180 a case 
involving a potential loss payee of an insurance policy, used a different 
intent test to reach the same result. 181 There, the plaintiff, an assignee of 
Domestic Bank, sued the defendant insurance company on an insurance 
contract between the insurance company and the bank's couriers. 182 
Domestic had contracted with NECD and IMS to courier cash from the 
bank to the bank's ATMs. 183 
The contract between Domestic and NECD and IMS provided that 
NECD and IMS would be liable for any loss resulting from employee 
malfeasance. 184 The contract required that NECD and IMS get insurance 
to cover any such liability. 185 NECD and IMS contracted with 
Navigators Insurance. 186 That contract included coverage of loss caused 
by employee wrongdoing, and designated Domestic as the sole potential 
loss payee. 187 
After four years of service, a government investigation alerted 
Domestic of discrepancies in the A TMs. 188 Domestic conducted its own 
audit and found that employees of NECD and IMS had conspired to 
defraud Domestic out of over $5 million over the course of those four 
years. 189 Domestic demanded compensation from NECD and IMS. 190 
When those companies did not respond, Domestic demanded 
compensation directly from Navigators. 191 
Navigators claimed that Domestic could not sue for breach of the 
insurance policy, because Domestic was not a named insured and 
therefore was not a party to that contract. 192 The court found that third 
party Domestic had a right to sue as a third party beneficiary if the 
parties intended that '"the promisor should assume a direct obligation to 
180. 934 F. Supp. 2d409 (D. Conn. 2013). 
181. Id. at418. 
182. Id. at412. 
183. Id. at 413. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. at 414. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
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the third party beneficiary."' 193 Under the terms of the insurance 
contract, Domestic had a right to receive direct payment from 
Navigators. 194 The court found that this granted Domestic rights as a 
third party beneficiary, despite language in the contract explicitly 
disclaiming rights for ~he insured's designee. 195 
The opinion lists several other cases that employed the same test. 196 
The test states that the third party has a right to sue as a third party 
beneficiary if the parties intended that "the promisor should assume a 
direct obligation to the third party beneficiary." 197 Neither this opinion, 
nor prior opinions, provide an explanation for this rule. 
3. Intent to Grant the Third Party Legal Rights in the Contract 
In Armbruster v. Wage Works, Inc., 198 Paul Armbruster sued 
WageWorks because WageWorks fired Armbruster's ex-wife, Lauren 
Coppock, causing her to forfeit her stock options. 199 As part of 
Armbruster and Coppock's divorce agreement, Armbruster was entitled 
to exercise half of Coppock' s stock options if Armbruster so directed. 200 
Armbruster was to provide any necessary funds ninety days before the 
exercise date, and Coppock was to deliver to Armbruster title to the 
resulting shares. 201 
Armbruster never directed Coppock to exercise his half of the 
options. 202 When Wage Works terminated Coppock, neither she nor 
Armbruster had the funds to exercise a majority of the stock options. 203 
Thus, as the Stock Options Plan stipulated, the stock options were 
forfeited three months after Coppock's termination. 204 
WageWorks moved to dismiss the contract claim, citing a lack of 
privity. 205 The Stock Options Plan was a contract with Coppock alone. 206 
193. Id. (citing Grigerik v. Sharpe, 721A.2d526, 536 (Conn. 1998)). 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
198. 953 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Ariz. 2013). 
199. Id. at 1074. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 11, Armbruster v. WageWorks, Inc., 953 F. 
Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Ariz. 2013) (No. CV-12-2058-PHX-ROS), 2012 WL 6569035. 
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Armbruster alleged that he was an intended third party beneficiary of the 
Stock Options Plan. 207 The court held that Armbruster was not an 
intended third party beneficiary. 208 The court explained that in order for 
a third party beneficiary to have standing in Arizona, the contracting 
parties must: 
1. Intend to directly benefit the third party; 
n. [i]ndicate that intent in the contract itself; and 
iii. [i]ntend to recognize the third party as the primary party in 
interest and as privy to the promise. 209 
Even if the contract shows an intent to benefit the third party, the 
parties must also intend to recognize the third party as privy to the 
promise, and thus legally able to sue for breach of contract, or the third 
party does not have standing. 210 
The Arizona court found no such intent in the contract between 
WageWorks and Coppock, and dismissed Armbruster's breach of 
contract claim. 211 And, again, we found no explanation by the Arizona 
court as to why the test for third party contract rights should be "intent to 
recognize [the third party] as the primary party in interest."212 
C. Summary of Cases 
We have used these representative cases to point out the division on 
intent issues. These cases can be used to make three additional points. 
First, the facts of present day cases contesting third party contract rights 
are more challenging than the simple loan repayment involved in 
Lawrence v. Fox or the causa mortis gift of Seaver v. Ransom. Second, 
the cases are conclusory rather than reasoned. Third, the conclusions are 
rooted in history rather than policy and practical consequences. 
206. Armbroster, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 1074. 
207. Id. at 1076. 
208. Id. 
209. Note that the court does not define "privy to the promise." See id. (citing Sherman v. First 
Am. Title Ins., 38 P.3d 1229, 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)). 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
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III. WHERE WE SHOULD BE 
Nineteenth century cases and early twentieth century law review 
articles on third party contract rights focused on privity and whether 
privity barred a third party from recovering on a contract made by 
others. In answering this question, cases like Lawrence v. Fox213 and 
Seaver v. Ransom214 and Professor Corbin and Williston's law review 
articles215 borrowed from trust law cases, concepts, and terminology. 216 
The early cases and scholarly commentary influenced the 1932 
Restatement of Contracts chapter "Contractual Rights of Persons Not 
Parties to the Contract"217 and, in turn, the comparable 1981 Restatement 
Second provisions. Even the recent cases on deciding when third parties 
have rights under contracts look to these early tests. 
The test for deciding when third parties have legal rights under 
contracts made by others should reflect the practical consequences of 
that decision. The practical consequences of an affirmative decision on 
the third party deemed an "intended beneficiary" are obvious-
obviously "beneficial" to the third party. 
Let us consider the less obvious practical consequences of third party 
contract rights on the promisee and the promisor. Everyone likes a 
benefit. It is the imposition of a detriment that can be problematic. 
Therefore, the focus of the courts should be on the detriment that results 
from legal recognition of third party contract rights. 
A. Consequences of Third Party Contract Rights on the Promisee 
Under current third party beneficiary law, an intended third party 
beneficiary is in every sense a "third party," not a new "second party." 
In other words, an intended third party beneficiary is not a replacement 
for the promisee, but rather a true third party, i.e., an additional party. As 
a result, deciding that a third party has contract rights against the 
promisor because the third party is an intended third party beneficiary 
does not affect the promisee's contract rights. An intended third party 
beneficiary transaction does not effect a transfer of contract rights. 218 
213. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); see also supra section I.B. 
214. 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918); see also supra section LC. 
215. Seesuprasectionl.D. 
216. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS 927 (8th ed. 2013) (using the phrase "centered 
on the law of trusts" while describing history of third party beneficiary law). 
217. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS ch. 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
218. See, e.g., Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Ctr., LLC, 354 P.3d 1172, 1181 (Idaho 2015)("[A] 
promise in a third-party beneficiary contract creates a duty in the promisor to the promisee to 
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That is one of the major legal differences between third party 
beneficiary law and the law governing assignments. When A contracts 
with B and then later A assigns her contract right to C, the assignor A no 
longer has any contract rights. 219 C, the assignee, replaces A, the 
assignor. 220 The consequence of an assignment is that the assignee 
replaces the assignor-the assignor no longer has contract law rights 
against the obligor. 
In third party beneficiary law, both the terminology and consequences 
are different from assignment law. The promisee of a third party 
beneficiary contract has the same rights as the promisee of any other 
contract. 221 
Reconsider the facts of our "first" third party beneficiary case, 
Lawrence v. Fox. 222 Remember that Lawrence had loaned $300 to 
Holly. 223 Holly then entered into a contract with Fox in which Holly 
loaned $300 to Fox.224 Fox then promised to pay $300 dollars to 
Lawrence. 225 After the promisor Fox breached, the third party Lawrence 
recovered $300 breach-of-contract damages from the promisor Fox, 
extinguishing Holly's debt to Lawrence in the process. 226 
In response to Fox's nonperformance, Lawrence could have instead 
sued Holly to recover the $300, extinguishing the original debt. Holly 
could have then sued Fox for breach of contract and recovered the $300 
of general expectation damages. In sum, like most promisees in third 
party beneficiary contracts, Holly would not be adversely affected by 
recognition of third party contract rights. 
perform the promise even though he also has a similar duty to the third-party beneficiary." (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 305(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981))). 
219. PERILLO, supra note 36, at 605 ("[A]ssignment extinguishes the right in the assignor and 
transfers it to the assignee."). 
220. Id. 
221. See, e.g., Campbell, 354 P.3d at 1180 ("Parkway's argument completely ignores the well-
established rule in contract law that even though a third-party beneficiary contract creates a duty to 
the beneficiary, the promisee still has a right to performance."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 305 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("[P]romisee of a promise for the benefit of a 
beneficiary has the same right to performance as any other promisee."). 
222. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859). 
223. Id. at 269. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
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B. Consequences of Third Party Contract Rights on the Promisor 
1. No Double Recovery 
What could not have happened in Lawrence v. Fox was both the third 
party Lawrence and the promisee Holly's recovering $300 in general 
expectation damages from Fox for breach of contract. The promisor is 
protected from double liability for a single breach. 
That protection can take various forms. If Lawrence, the third party 
beneficiary, sues the promisor Fox first and recovers, then the promisee 
Holly's debt has been extinguished and Holly has no cause of action-
no expectation damages. Lawrence's recovery from Fox would satisfy 
Holly's debt to Lawrence, leaving the promisee Holly in the same 
position as if the contract had been performed. If, on the other hand, the 
promisee Holly is the first to sue Fox, then Fox could protect itself from 
the possibility of double liability by interpleader.227 
Double recovery from the promisor for the same loss is not a 
consequence of third party contract rights. The third party and the 
promisee cannot both recover from the promisor for the same loss. 228 
2. More Damages 
In Lawrence v. Fox, the promisor Fox's breach had the same effect on 
both the third party Lawrence and the promisee Holly. Both Lawrence 
and Holly would sustain the same $300 loss from the breach. The 
general expectation damages that a court would award for Fox's breach 
would be the same amount, $300, regardless of whether the plaintiff was 
Holly the promisee or Lawrence the third party. 
In Lawrence v. Fox, as in other cases involving a "creditor 
beneficiary," permitting a third party to be a plaintiff did not change the 
plaintiffs loss, and therefore did not change the damages that the 
plaintiff could recover from the breaching promisor. 
As our second third party beneficiary case, Seaver v. Ransom, 
illustrates, intended third party beneficiaries are not always creditor 
beneficiaries. And, as Seaver v. Ransom and the other cases set out 
below illustrate, a promisor's breach will not always have the same 
effect on both the third party and the promisee. Permitting a third party 
227. PERILLO, supra note 36, at 600 (describing how to avoid double liability by "utilizing 
interpleader procedure or other procedural techniques"). 
228. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 305(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
("[S]atisfaction of the promisor's duty to the beneficiary satisfies to that extent the promisor's duty 
to the promisee."). 
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to be a plaintiff can change the damages that can be recovered from the 
breaching promisor. 
Recall that the contract in Seaver v. Ransom229 included a promise by 
Judge Beman to his wife that he would leave $6000 to her niece, Marion 
Seaver. 230 Mrs. Beman predeceased the Judge who then breached the 
contract to leave $6000 to Marion Seaver in his will. 231 Because the 
court held that Marion Seaver was an intended third party beneficiary, 
she was entitled to recover expectation damages from the promisor, 
Judge Beman's estate.232 And her expectation damages were $6000, 
which put her in the same financial position as if there had been no 
breach.233 
The promisee would be Mrs. Beman or her estate. And, if Mrs. 
Beman's estate had sued Judge Beman's estate for breach of contract, 
any expectation damages awarded to Mrs. Beman's estate (the promisee) 
would have been $0 because the promisor Judge Beman's breach had no 
financial impact on the promisee Mrs. Beman's estate. Under the 
contract, Judge Beman promised to pay $6,000 to Marion Seaver; thus, 
permitting Mrs. Beman's estate to recover the $6,000 would have put the 
estate in a better position that it would have been had Judge Beman 
performed. 
On the Seaver v. Ransom facts, permitting a third party to be the 
plaintiff can change the damages that can be recovered from the 
breaching promisor. And the possibility that the third party can recover 
more from the promisor than the promisee is not limited to the facts of 
Seaver v. Ransom. 
Much more recently, the Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized 
intended third party beneficiary rights in Fabian v. Lindsay. 234 In this 
case, Dr. Denis Fabian ("Denis") contracted with the law firm of 
Lindsay & Lindsay ("Lindsay") to prepare a trust under which Erika 
Fabian ("Erika") would receive half of his estate, subject to Denis's 
wife's life estate.235 The court recognized intended third party 
beneficiary rights in Erika. 236 This imposed liability on the promisor 
(Lindsay), that would not have been imposed in a lawsuit by the 
229. 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918). 
230. Id. at 639-40. 
231. Id. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. 
234. 765 S.E.2d 132 (S.C. 2014). 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 134. 
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promisee (Denis). 237 All parties involved acknowledged that Denis had 
intended to include Erika in his trust. 238 After Denis' s death, Erika 
discovered that, due to Lindsay's drafting error, she had been effectively 
disinherited. 239 
Erika sued Lindsay, alleging, inter alia, that Lindsay had breached its 
contract with Denis and that she was an intended third party beneficiary 
of that contract. 240 In ruling for Erika, the Court noted that, because 
Denis was dead and his estate lacked both a cause of action and 
damages, the only person entitled to damages for Lindsay's breach of 
contract was the third party beneficiary, Erika. 241 
Since Denis's estate was worth approximately $13 million, the 
liability exposure of the promisor Lindsay to the third party Erika was 
substantial. 242 Even if Denis's estate could sue Lindsay for its breach of 
contract, the estate's recovery would be minimal or too uncertain to 
award. Lindsay's breach did not cause any financial loss to the estate. At 
best, Denis's estate could argue that Lindsay's breach would have 
distressed Denis if Denis were still alive. How can a court measure 
expectation damages for distress of a deceased person? Answer: the 
court cannot and so there is no recovery by the promisee. 243 
Both Seaver and Fabian involved donee-beneficiaries who recovered 
more than the promisee was entitled under the contract. However, this 
outcome extends to other classes of third party beneficiaries, as well. For 
example, in Cianciotta v. Hospice Care Network, 244 a New York District 
Court permitted a third party beneficiary to recover consequential 
damages despite the fact that such damages were not available to the 
promisee.245 The litigation arose after Cianciotto's father contracted with 
Hospice Care Network ("HCN") to provide him with palliative care for a 
period of up to six months or until his death, depending on which 
occurred first. 246 HCN allegedly breached the contract by refusing to 
237. Id. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 134. 
241. Id. at 137. 
242. Id. at 134. 
243. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
("Damages for emotional disturbance are not ordinarily allowed. Even if they are foreseeable, they 
are often particularly difficult to establish and to measure."). 
244. 927 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2011). 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 781-82. 
2016] AN "APP" FOR THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES 1697 
provide care after "only a few weeks," which forced Cianciotto to 
resume caring for her father. 247 Upon her father's death, Cianciotto filed 
a suit claiming damages of $15,000 based on economic loss and 
emotional distress stemming from missed employment opportunities and 
being forced to watch her father deteriorate. 248 
The Court held that because the contract expressly contemplated a 
benefit to Cianciotto by relieving her of some caregiving duties, her 
claim should survive the motion to dismiss. 249 In so ruling, the court 
noted that Cianciotto' s father and his estate did not suffer the damages 
Cianciotto sought. 250 
Obviously, in a lawsuit brought by the promisee, Cianciotto's father, 
or his estate, no expectation damages would be awarded for the third 
party Cianciotto's lost economic opportunities or pain and suffering. 
Such damages are "special" to the third party beneficiary Cianciotto, i.e., 
the third party beneficiary's consequential damages. 251 
Third party beneficiaries can recover their consequential damages 252 
unless the contract between the prornisor and the promisee limits 
remedies to exclude consequential damages. 253 And, the amount of those 
consequential damages can be many times greater than the gross contract 
price.254 
As a result, contracting parties should be, and are, concerned about 
consequential damages. That is why so many commercial contracts 
contain provisions eliminating liability for consequential damages. 
247. Id. at 782. 
248. Id. at 782, 785-86. Although emotional damages are not usually recoverable under breach of 
contract claims, there is a special exception for contracts dealing with end of life care and the 
handling of dead bodies, especially when the harm is a "direct" result of the breach as opposed to 
being "consequential." 
249. Id. at 784. 
250. Id. at 785-86. 
251. See MURRAY, supra note 99, at 767 ('"Special damages' are often called 'consequential 
damages."'). 
252. See, e.g., Delgado v. Kornegay, 395 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 1977) (ruling 
home purchaser was entitled to recover· consequential damages resulting from breach of termite 
inspection contract between home seller and inspector). 
253. See, e.g., Harris Moran Seed Co. v. Phillips, 949 So. 2d 916, 930-31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) 
("As a third-party beneficiary of the contract between HMSC and Clifton Seed Company, the 
farmers step into Clifton Seed Company's shoes for purposes of the consequential-damages 
exclusion."). 
254. Cf Metro. Life Ins. v. Noble Lowndes Int'!, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504, 508 (N.Y. 1994) (noting 
that the seller "would be under inordinate economic pressure to complete performance, being at risk 
of incurring liability for consequential damages in sums ... many times greater than the gross 
contract price" without a clause limiting liability). 
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Indeed, concern about the impact of third party consequential 
damages led to the Restatement excluding a third party's recovery of 
consequential damages under government contracts. 255 The test for 
determining when a third party has contract rights under contracts 
between private parties should at least reflect concern about the impact 
of third party consequential damages on the promisor. 
In sum, recognition of third party contract rights exposes the promisor 
to the possibility of a different liability. The promisor's breach might 
have a different effect on the third party than on the promisee, leading to 
different and possibly greater damages. 
3. More Litigation 
Obviously, a determination that if a person breaches a contract then 
not only the other contracting party but also a third party can be a 
plaintiff, increases the possibility of litigation. Two tigers behind one of 
the doors is more problematic than only one tiger behind one of the 
doors. 256 While we cannot predict that enabling twice as many people to 
be plaintiffs will result in twice as much litigation, it is reasonable to 
argue-even without supporting empirical data-that determining that a 
third party has contract rights means more litigation. 
And, it is reasonable to argue that a third party might initiate litigation 
in situations in which the other contracting party would not. Moreover, 
this argument is supported by empirical data. 
For example, as Professor Chapin Cimino recently wrote, "most legal 
scholars accept the core insight of what is called relational contract 
theory: most commercial contracts involve repeat players who seek to 
maximize wealth while still maintaining cooperative relationships."257 
These relationships are generally maintained by relying on non-legal 
sanctions. These repeat players are reluctant to file a lawsuit because 
litigating "threatens to disrupt the norms necessary to continuing 
relations."258 Third parties have no such concern about disrupting 
continuing relations because they have no cooperative relationship with 
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("[A] 
promisor who contracts with a government or governmental agency to do an act for or render a 
service to the public is not subject to contractual liability to a member of the public for 
consequential damages."). 
256. Cf Frank R. Stockton, The Lady, or the Tiger?, CENTURY, Nov. 1882, at 83. 
257. Chapin F. Cimino, The Relational Economics of Commercial Contract, 3 TEX. A&M L. 
REv. 91, 91 (2015) (emphasis in original). See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual 
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). 
258. Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 49, 79 (1995). 
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the promisor to continue. Therefore, third parties are more likely to sue 
for breach of contract than a contracting party. 
In sum, recognition of third party contract rights increases the 
possibility that the promisor will be sued if it breaches and, at least in 
some cases, increases the amount of damages that the plaintiff can 
recover for such a breach. 259 
C. An Analytical Approach that Reflects Practical Consequences 
The primary practical consequence of determining that a third party 
can enforce a contract that an individual did not make is remedial: 260 
more specifically, the creation of an additional possible plaintiff 
Remember, the third party is not merely a "beneficiary"; they are a 
"plaintiff." 
The use of the term "beneficiary" to describe the third party only 
makes sense in a historical context. Early cases such as Lawrence v. 
Fox 261 and Seaver v. Ransom 262 relied on trust cases for precedent, 263 
and the term "beneficiary" is of course an important part of trust law. 
Under what Professor Lawrence Cunningham describes as common 
law's "iterative process," subsequent cases continued to use the term 
"beneficiary. "264 
In light of the practical consequences of determining that a third party 
can enforce a contract, "additional possible plaintiff' is a more 
descriptive contract law term than "third party beneficiary." "Intent" that 
someone can "benefit" from your performance of a contract is very 
259. Cf Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1429 ("[A]llowing a third party to enforce a contract may 
unduly enlarge a promisor's liability."). 
260. Id. at 1430 (labeling third party beneficiary law a "remedial device"); see also HENRY M. 
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW 136 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) ("If A promises 
B that he will pay B's debt to C and the promise is valid and binding, it is obvious that Chas a 
primary 'right' at least in the sense ofa claim to the benefit of the performance of A's promise. But 
as every first-year law student knows it has not been obvious to many courts that C has a right of 
action against A if A fails to pay the debt. Only B, these courts have held, enjoys the remedial 
capacity to hail A into court and enforce a sanction against him for breach of his promise. A system 
of analysis which permits confusion between a primary claim to a performance and a remedial 
capacity to invoke a sanction for nonperformance is dangerous at best."). 
261. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); see also supra section I.B. 
262. Seaver v. Ransom, 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918); see also supra section I.C. 
263. See Cunningham, supra note 33, at 751 ("The court's [Lawrence v. Fox] input rule was from 
the law of trusts and produced an output rule of contract law that permitted a stranger to a contract 
to enforce it."); Waters, supra note 7, at 1122, 1138. 
264. Cunningham, supra note 33, at 750--57 (using Lawrence v. Fox and the third party 
beneficiary cases following Lawrence v. Fox to illustrate common law as an "iterative process"). 
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different from understanding that someone can sue you for not 
performing a contract. 
The use of the term "intended," like the use of the term "beneficiary," 
creates unnecessary ambiguities because "intent" is more in the nature of 
a conclusion than a test. "Intent" is a recurring concern in contract law, 
and contract cases are divided as to what factors should lead to a 
conclusion of intent. 265 
Ascertaining contractual intent is difficult enough in the typical 
breach of contract action in which both the plaintiff and the defendant 
were parties to the contract. Questions of intent become much more 
complicated when a third party is the plaintiff because the jury will be 
hearing the plaintiff's arguments about contractual intention in a deal 
that the plaintiff did not personally negotiate or document. 
Consider the recently revised Florida jury instruction on third party 
beneficiaries: 
416.2 THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY 
(Claimant) is not a party to the contract. However, (claimant) 
may be entitled to damages for breach of the contract if 
[he][she][it] proves that (insert names of the contracting parties) 
intended that (claimant) benefit from their contract. 266 
An article in the Florida Bar Journal describes this as "a concise 
instruction to give the jury to determine easily if someone is a third-party 
beneficiary."267 With all due respect268 to the author who is the "former 
elected-Chair of the 1700-member Florida Appellate Practice 
Section,"269 we disagree. Perhaps we have read too many Carl Hiaasen 
265. Compare Dietrich v. Stephens, No. 05-CV-72113, 2010 WL 1286204, at *4 (E.D. Mich. 
Mar. 30, 2010) ("[I]ntent exists only at the time the contract was made."), with Stender v. Twin City 
Foods, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 250, 510 P.2d 221, 224 (Wash. 1973) ("Determination of the intent of the 
contracting parties is to be accomplished by viewing the contract as a whole, the subject matter and 
objective of the contract, all the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, the 
subsequent acts and conduct of the parties to the contract, and the reasonableness of respective 
interpretations advocated by the parties." (emphasis added)). See also Uribe v. Merch. Bank of 
N.Y., 693 N.E.2d 740, 743 (N.Y. 1998) ('"[R]easonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary 
business[person] when making an ordinary business contract' serve as the guideposts to determine 
intent." (brackets in original)). 
266. In re Standard Jury Instructions-Contract and Bus. Cases, 116 So. 3d 284, 304 (Fla. 2013). 
267. Dorothy F. Easley, Florida's New Jury Instructions in Contracts and Business Law Cases: A 
Primer, 88 FLA. B.J. 40, 40 (Apr. 2014). 
268. See With All Due Respect - Ricky Bobbyjlv, YouTuBE (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www. 
youtube.corn/watch?v=xVTpCViyUwM (last visited Nov. 4, 2016). 
269. Lawyers, EASLEY APPELLATE PRACTICE, http://www.easleyappellate.com/Appeal_Attomey. 
html [https://perma.cc/3VGT-J8E8]. 
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novels, 270 but we believe that a Florida jury will neither "determine 
easily if someone is a third party beneficiary" nor fully understand the 
consequences of such a determination. 
Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott recently wrote about the 
"uncertainty that attends the intent test."271 More specifically, they 
question, "Does it mean acting with a motive to achieve a result or 
knowing the result is likely to follow? Does it refer to the 'ends' the 
actor seeks to achieve or the 'means' to those ends?"272 Professors Scott 
and Schwartz then suggest that "[a] law and economics analysis would 
support an objective, functional test."273 While we do not warrant that 
we understand all the law and economics formulae in the Schwartz and 
Scott article, we also suggest an objective, functional test. 
The function of third party beneficiary law is to identify when a 
contracting party has the risk of additional possible plaintiffs. 274 Each 
party to a contract is entitled to know the risks and liabilities involved in 
entering a contract and that "necessarily includes the range of potential 
third persons who may enforce the terms of the contract."275 Such 
knowledge is essential to an informed decision on entering the contract 
and pricing its terms. That is why the Florida instruction on special 
damages is as follows: 
504.2 BREACH OF CONTRACT DAMAGES 
* * * 
b. Special damages: 
... To recover special damages, (claimant) must prove that 
when the parties made the contract, (defendant) knew or 
reasonably should have known of the special circumstances 
leading to such damages. 276 
270. Cf Erin Z. Bass, Carl Hiaasen 's Most Memorable Characters, DEEPS. MAGAZINE (June 11, 
2013), http://deepsouthmag.com/2013/06/carl-hiaasens-most-memorable-characters/ [https://perma 
.cc/XQ4A-JALB]. 
271. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. 
274. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 115, at 6 (describing third party beneficiary law as "one 
aspect of the extent of risk undertaken by a contracting party"); Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1430 
(labeling third party beneficiary law a "remedial device"). 
275. Gazo v. City of Stamford, 765 A.2d 505, 514 (Conn. 2001). See Powers, supra note 9, at 78 
(suggesting "overriding policy" in third party beneficiary law should be "how is a contracting party 
to evaluate the risks and liabilities involved in entering a contract."). 
276. In re Standard Jury Instructions-Contract and Bus. Cases, 116 So. 3d 284, 333 (Fla. 2013) 
(emphasis in original). 
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And that knowledge of possible obligations necessarily should 
include the range of third persons who can enforce the contract-the 
additional possible plaintiffs. Accordingly, the jury instruction in Florida 
and other states for whether a third party can be a plaintiff in an action to 
enforce a contract that she did not make should ask: "did the defendant 
have reason to know at the time of the contract that the third party was 
an additional possible plaintiff who could ultimately recover damages?" 
Under the law governing contract damages, Ed's liability exposure to 
Bud for breach of the butcher shop sale contract would be limited to the 
losses he had "reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when 
the contract was made."277 Under the law governing third parties' 
contract rights, Ed's possible liability exposure to Noreen or other third 
parties should be similarly limited. Simply put, the question should be 
whether Ed would have made the contract with Bud on the same terms if 
he had reason to know at the time of the contract that Noreen was an 
additional possible plaintiff in the event of his later breach. 278 
CONCLUSION 
As Albert Camus (and perhaps Noreen279) would tell us, "One 
recognizes one's course by discovering the paths that stray from it."280 
The present law of third party beneficiaries "strays." It reflects its 
nineteenth century analytical origins, not its twenty-first century 
application. In determining whether a third party has the legal right to 
enforce a contract she did not make, courts ask whether the contracting 
277. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 351(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The language 
of the Restatement is not identical to the language of the Uniform Commercial Code or the Florida 
jury instruction. The Restatement uses the phrase "reason to foresee," id., while Uniform 
Commercial Code section 2-715 and the Florida jury instruction use "reason to know" and 
"reasonably should have known." U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 
2002). A comprehensive review of the consequential damages case Jaw suggests "courts freely 
interchange these expressions." Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Consequential Damages for 
Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 665, 669 (1994). 
278. Cf Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, in PRACTICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 20 (Mary J. Gregor ed. and trans., 1996) ("The touchstone of everything that can be 
concluded as a law for a people lies in the question whether the people could have imposed such a 
law on itself."). 
279. Cf Terri Schwartz, Fargo: The Gift of the Magi, IGN (Nov. 10, 2015), 
http://in.ign.com/m/the-gift-of-the-magi/82994/review/fargo-the-gift-of-the-magi-review 
[https://perma.cc/5R25-PFYB] ("Noreen, the butcher shop cashier, was reading 'The Myth of 
Sisyphus' in scenes."). 
280. See ALBERT CAMUS, Absurd Creation: Ephemeral Creation, in THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS 
AND OTHER ESSAYS 93, 113 (Justin O'Brien trans., 1955). 
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parties intended to confer a benefit on the plaintiff. In short, the test is 
"intent to benefit. "281 
We have argued here that this is the wrong test and the wrong 
question. And, of course, asking juries the wrong question is more likely 
to iead to the wrong result than asking the right question. 
The "course" should be appropriate liability exposure for contracting 
parties. The result of recognizing third party contract rights is enlarging 
a contracting party's liability exposure. 
Enlarging a contract party's liability exposure and finding a contract 
party's intention to benefit someone are not the same thing. The function 
of the test for whether a third party has contract rights should be to 
assure that a person can enter into a contract with the confidence that she 
will not later find herself bound to unanticipated obligations. 
Accordingly, courts should take a different, more functional "path" to 
third party contract rights. Instead of determining whether buyer Ed 
Blomquist and/or seller Bud Jorgenlen intended for the contract for the 
sale of Bud's Butcher Shop to benefit Noreen Vanderslice as courts now 
do, a court should determine whether Ed had reason to know, at the time 
he contracted with Bud, that Noreen or some other third person similar 
to Noreen was an additional possible plaintiff in the event he breached, 
i.e. an "APP." 
281. See, e.g., Hickman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 695 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Minn. 2005) ("The 
issue in this case is whether appellant ... is a third-party beneficiary ... under the 'intent to benefit' 
test."). 
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